Ethnic nationalism and politics dominated by ethno-nationalistic aspirations tends to contradict the ideal of inter-ethnic tolerance and respect for human rights. This is often the case in societies that have experienced weak state governance and inequality such as has been the case in Kosovo in the 1990s. This article the circumstances under which ‘Kosovar’ identity can develop into a supra-ethnic identity that de-emphasises ethnicity and ethno-nationalistic sentiments as organising principles of society. What is the criteria for a successful transitional process that transforms the current ethno-nationalistic political discourse in Kosovo into one based on the ‘kosovar’ identity?
The theoretical framework for this
discussion will be based on Ernest Gellner’s work and
his definition of nationalism - a principle that guards the balance of the homogenous
character of the nation. The nation gives its members an expectation of a shared
and homogenous high culture and the impression that this high culture is
represented by the state. Its implementation phase, what Gellner
calls ‘early nationalism’, is therefore critical - its citizens have
egalitarian expectations confronted with a non-egalitarian reality; cultural
homogeneity has not yet been reached (Gellner
1983:73ff). We know from many areas of the world throughout history, that in
periods of change and inequality, political movements based upon ethnicity
might rise (Llobera 1994:104, Bowman 1994, Eriksen
1993:100). This has also been the case with the Yugoslav federation. Influenced
by the political development throughout
This article looks at three aspects
of the ‘Kosovar’ identity that are critical to its development.
First, the relation between Kosovo-Albanians and
Economy is of immense importance
in international relations and in creating perception of ‘the others’. John Rex
claims, that what he call ‘economic’ nationalism can lead to separatist
movements and successful nationalism (Rex 1997), as was the case with
“The overwhelming majority of all Albanians agree that the different historical paths taken by the people of Albania as distinct from those from the former Yugoslavia, mean that a certain amount of time has to pass before either group is ready for the difficulties that they themselves, let alone their neighbours, would have to face in trying to unite geographically all the Albanians of the Balkans. Nevertheless, a new political and national identity is still in the process of formation” (International Crisis Group 2000).
The cultural difference between Kosovo and Albania is partly based upon a different perception of the state and its governance – the Yugoslavian state system differed greatly from the Albanian, and Kosovo-Albanians have also had their own parallel state system running throughout the 1990s.Though the Albanian people in Kosovo might feel that they are now getting closer and closer to the Albanian people in Albania, compared to the closed border of Tito’s Yugoslavia and Hoxha’s Albania, the cultural difference between the two is also more and more acknowledged and stressed by Kosovo-Albanians.
An indicator of the strength of
the relation between Albanians in Kosovo and the Albanian state is the Albanian
common language convention, referred to as ‘gjuha letrare’. Gjuha Letrare was created at a Grammar Conference in Tirana in 1972,
and is predominantly based on the ‘Tosk’ dialect of
The language debate in Kosovo also
indicates that Albanians in Kosovo can identify themselves with an official
language slightly different from their daily speech as long as there is a
reason for it. For example if there is an external threat, like the Serbian
regime and the subsequent mobilisation of the ‘National Question’. As Kosovo has its own governmental
institutions out of reach for
The recognised ethnic groups in
Kosovo are Albanian, Serb, Turk, Roma, Ashkalja,
Egyptian, Bosniac and Gorani.
Kosovo is more or less divided into two territories – one Albanian and one Serbian,
depending on which group is in a dominant position. The Serbian areas are the
North of Mitrovica and the areas bordering Serbia, as
well as small pockets often referred to as ‘enclaves’ elsewhere in Central and
Eastern Kosovo. The other ethnic groups seek acceptance from the dominant group
in their area. The demographical division in Kosovo mirrors the political
division that follows the same ethnic boundary. Albanians and minorities in
their territory seek independence, while the Serbian areas seek re-integration
with
Though many Kosovo-Serbs acknowledge that their community is also part of the category ‘Kosovar’ or ‘Kosovas’ (in Serbian), some of their leaders have indicated that they will not support the development of a Kosovo territorial identity, as they fear that this will support the Kosovo-Albanian claims for independence. A prominent Kosovo-Serbian religious leader is for example quoted to have said “There is no such thing as Kosovars, only Albanians and Serbs”.
During the elections preparations when Serb participation in the Provincial elections were still a big question mark, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) chose not to use terms as ‘minority’, ‘kosovar’ and ethnic groups. Rather the OSCE would use ‘community’ for any village and then refer to it according to which ethnic group is dominant. It would also refer to Kosovars as ‘habitual residents’. The Civil Administration pillar of the UN did however not hesitate to use the term ‘minorities’[5]. The OSCE was more sensitive to criticism because they were responsible for arranging the elections and promote the participation of all ethnic groups[6]. The discrepancy in the usage of these terms shows that there is a need for a term that refers to the whole population. The term currently in use, ‘habitual resident’, do not have any other than technical connotations.
Of concern is also the split in political affiliation among the representatives from the Coalition Return. The Candidate List is said to reflect the struggle between the Yugoslav federation, with President Kostunica and the Serbian state government and Prime Minister Djindjic. Some have expressed concern that the first group is definitely more negative to support the self-government institutions than the latter. Critical for this process is whether the Serb population finally feel that their interests are represented and that the self-government institutions service them on equal basis with Albanians. This again relies on a functional Provincial Assembly. Political Officers in the UN administration is convinced that they will approve symbols of representation (like flag, emblems and even national anthem) as long as it is based on consensus in the Provincial Assembly, meaning that it is approved by the Serb community and other minorities.
The international employees
working in the UN are split between those who have sympathy for the Serbs and
those who have sympathy for the Albanians (often changing according to which
group is perceived as suffering the most).
The split between Serbian and Albanian sympaties
does to some extent reflect the citizenship of the employee. This is particulary true in OSCE, where all international employees
with few exceptions are seconded by their respective states. Kosovo-Albanians
will often refer to the French as Serbian-friendly, while Americans are seen as
more sympathetic to the Albanian cause. The UNSCR 1244 is however a platform
that international employees are committed to, keeping Kosovo as a
Currently the international administration emphasise that Kosovo creates sustainable democratic institutions that operates according to the standards of other European states. This process involves a development were there is congruence between the sentiments of the people and its government(which Gellner defines as the nationalist principle). As long as the limits of self-governance allowed within the UNSCR 1244 framework is not reached, there will be no change in the direction of this development. The report from the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2001) and its recommendation on granting ‘conditional’ independence to Kosovo is an indication that the limits of what the international community is ready to approve is not yet reached. The final status issue relies on the regional political development and in particular on whether the Yugoslav federation will prevail as it is today. Until now, the general development strengthens the perception that “more independence” will be granted gradually. Subsequently, there is a optimism in the (Albanian-oriented) population with regards to the direction of the final status issue – and therefore more willingness to concession towards the international community, which will strengthen the self-governmental institutions, and thereby the development of Kosovo-unique symbols of representation and the ‘Kosovar’ identity. If this trend turns, however, and the general perception is that the full potential of the self-governance of Kosovo is reached (and it is not independence), the support to pan-Albanian political orientation and ethno-nationalism might increase.
The gradual introduction of self-governance is a careful process were the Kosovo-Albanians and Albanian-sympathic minorities are given reason to be optimistic about the progress and their claim for independence, while not contradicting UNSCR 1244 and loosing the participation of the minorities, as the minorities are a crucial part of the development. Success in this act of balancing has started to transform ethnic nationalism into a more civic strive for making the new institutions reflect the culture of the population it services. Essential to the ‘Kosovar’ identity is the success of the international administration in establishing institutions that provides good governance to its population, in a way that its people can identify with. While doing so, congruence between the sentiments of the people and its government is developed, and therefore a ‘Kosovo nationalism’ is promoted. This Kosovo nationalism can be developed into civic nationalistic sentiments for Kosovo and the future of its population, the ‘kosovars’. The Kosovar identity will therefore be strengthened along with the strengthening of the self-governance institutions. The Kosovar identity has thus the potential of transcending the widespread ethno-nationalist politics in Kosovo, first of all among Albanians, but on longer-term also the Serbs. This process is however more or less an unconscious process, as there is an internal censorship within the UN administration about discussing any issues that may alter the UNSCR 1244 interim status of Kosovo.
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and Nationalism,
Rex, John 1997 "The
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Rex,
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Fantasy and the Nation: The Logic of Ethnic Violence in Former
ICG report 2000 "What happened to the KLA", www.crisisweb.org
Independent International
Commission on Kosovo, 2001 The Kosovo report, www.kosovocommission.org
[1] This
paper derives from my work with a thesis for the Cand.Polit.
degree in Social Anthropology at the
[2] It is
not legitimate to refer to Kosovo as a nation-state today, as it is, according
to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, still a
[3] Kosovo is often referred to as the ‘first’ humanitarian intervention, as arguments for international intervention were purely humanitarian and not based on political interests. This is of course a simplified assumption that also indicates a gross misconception of the political interests of the states referred to as the ‘international community’.
[4] The
bombing campaign started
[5] In a joint operation between the OSCE and UN Civil Administration aiming to register the population and targeting the Serb community in particular into the Civil Registry and the Voter’s List for the elections, the OSCE would call the operation ‘Community Registration’, while the UN called it ‘Minority Registration’.
[6] The Kosovo-Serbs boycotted the first Municipal Elections in October 2000.